In this paper we test the well-known hypothesis of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) that trade costs are the key to explaining the so-called Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. Using a gravity framework in an intertemporal context, we provide strong support for the hypothesis and we reconcile our results with the so-called home bias puzzle. Interestingly, this requires a fundamental revision of Obstfeld and Rogoff's argument. A further novelty of our work is in tying bilateral trade behavior in a world of multiple countries to desired trade balances and desired intertemporal trade.
A large body of work seeks to explain the so-called Feldstein-Horioka (FH) puzzle; the phenomenon of excessive reliance on domestic saving in order to finance domestic investment, which results in current account imbalances which are too small to be consistent with a world of high capital mobility. In a recent provocative paper, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) propose trade costs as the explanation for not only this puzzle but also five other major puzzles in international macroeconomics. Although there are now a large number of competing explanations for the FH puzzle (see, for example, Obstfeld (1986) , Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987) , Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) and Taylor (2002)), Obstfeld and Rogoff (OR) emphasize that the alternative explanations often suffer from other problems. In this paper, we test OR's key emphasis on the role of trade costs in explaining the FH puzzle. We provide strong support for their hypothesis and we reconcile our results with the so-called home bias puzzle. Additionally, we shed light on the importance of national plans to borrow and lend in explaining bilateral trade. Our approach is perhaps best understood against the backdrop of OR's interpretation of the FH puzzle.
The OR story runs as follows. First, any shift in a country's trade balance requires some movement between import prices inclusive of trade costs and prices of home goods exclusive of trade costs. A real exchange rate change is thus required to alter trade balances because of trade costs alone. Pressures to resist such changes may then explain the observed sluggishness of trade balances. In developing their argument, OR rely heavily on the intertemporal budget constraint. For example, in the current period, a country with a large negative trade balance will face higher prices inclusive of customs, insurance and freight (CIF) and those exclusive of these, or free on board (FOB), and thereby less favorable terms of trade. In the next period, however, there will be a resulting need to pay the added obligations on foreign debt and this will imply an opposite movement in the terms of trade. Thus, negative trade balances today mean lower expected future consumer prices relative to present consumer prices and therefore imply higher expected real interest rates. As a result of this direct link between trade costs in goods markets and foreign borrowing, OR make the current account the focus of their discussion in addressing the FH puzzle. In support of their hypothesis, OR demonstrate the presence of a negative correlation between the average values of real interest rates and current account surpluses over the period 1990 to 1997 for 24 OECD countries and up to 32 others. Since then Bergin and Glick (2003) have reached the same conclusion in a related empirical test and with similar reasoning.
In this paper, we use a gravity model to capture the effects of trade costs on bilateral trade. In contrast to other gravity studies, however, we admit intertemporal substitution in the usual general equilibrium form of the model. Correspondingly, we impose an intertemporal objective in our empirical work. Concretely, we require the equality of desired aggregate borrowing/lending by country and the observed national aggregates. It turns out that the required satisfaction of this intertemporal objective plays an important role in enabling us to assess the significance of trade costs in explaining aggregate trade and the FH puzzle. Our measure of trade costs relies on the relationship of consumption prices to output prices. But we introduce some other controls in our tests with results that, in turn, strongly reinforce our interpretation of our measure as reflecting the influence of trade costs.
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we provide a general overview of some closely related work in order to motivate our research. Section 3 develops our theory and test specification. There we explain both our general version of the gravity model and the particular features of our model that permit us to reason about national trade balances despite our reliance on bilateral trade data. Our data set is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 contains our empirical results of the tests of the gravity equation. In this section, we demonstrate that large movements in the trade balance require large changes in the prices of imports relative to home goods. According to our estimate, a one percentage-point movement in the trade balance would require a one and two-thirds percentage-point movement in consumer prices relative to domestic-output prices. Section 6 develops the reasoning underlying our view that this relative price influence can be properly seen as reflecting essentially trade costs. Next, section 7 reconciles our results with OR's analysis of the home bias puzzle, which emerges as an important issue, as we shall see. Section 8 concludes.
Motivation and Related Literature
In this section we consider the basic story OR use to explain the FH puzzle in terms of trade costs, and show how our own methods can be used to explain the FH puzzle. As we have seen, the OR explanation for the FH puzzle relies on exploiting the intertemporal budget constraint. In the current period, a country with a large negative trade balance will face higher CIF prices relative to FOB prices, and the resulting need to pay the added obligations on foreign debt in the next period will imply an opposite movement in the terms of trade at that time. Thus, because of trade costs alone, negative trade balances today mean lower expected future consumer prices relative to present consumer prices now and therefore imply higher expected real interest rates. However, and crucially, the associated swings in desired trade balances, in turn, should lead to corresponding capital flows. The reality, as Feldstein and Horioka and many others have observed, is quite different. Instead, there is a close link between national savings and national investment suggesting that international capital movements provide for only limited intertemporal substitution and permit only limited current account imbalances (relative to the imbalances that would exist if capital was truly highly mobile). The reason, in OR's view, is that agents recognize that, because of trade costs, swings in trade balances will imply dramatic movements in real interest rates that, in turn, are socially costly. The existence of trade costs therefore places limits on intertemporal substitution and the smoothing of consumption through trade. As a result, we observe rather sluggish current account behavior. OR and in their wake, Bergin and Glick (2003) , support this hypothesis with evidence of a strong negative correlation between average real interest rates and current account surpluses.
However, the essential facts of current account behavior suggest that focusing directly on the current account in order to make sense of the FH puzzle is likely to be misguided. Contrary to OR, current borrowers cannot expect to be future lenders within the foreseeable future. Instead, the evidence would support the view that many deficit countries can run deficits almost indefinitely because of previously accumulated net foreign assets, and conversely. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002a) (based on a study of 20 OECD countries) demonstrate this very point. In a further study covering 68 countries, over the period 1970 -1998 , Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002b also point out that a (small) majority of countries did not switch at any time between the state of net lender or net borrower. Moreover, when they used an errorcorrection representation of the data to estimate the speed of adjustment towards a trend value of the ratio of net borrowing to GDP, they found that the movement has a half-life of 5-6 years. 1 These considerations suggest a basic modification of OR's explanation of the FH puzzle that does not rely on the intertemporal budget constraint. Specifically, any country wishing to alter its current account position must alter its trade balance and therefore must move some of its prices FOB to prices CIF, or vice versa. What our previous discussion suggests is if the shift in relative prices needed to obtain a modest change in the current account is large, the resulting shift in prices will act as a deterrent. Small trade balances will ensue. Based on the properties of the time series, as we shall show, this will render current account balances small too. On this view, the key to understanding the FH puzzle lies in understanding trade balance behavior. Trade costs underlie the FH puzzle, just as OR say, but on more direct grounds than theirs. We shall proceed on this logic, omitting any direct role for the intertemporal budget constraint, which is central to OR's argument.
Our test procedure will also deviate from previous methods of dealing with trade balances, current accounts and the FH puzzle. Since trade costs are the key issue, we shall use the principal tool in trade to deal with trade frictions, namely, the gravity model. We believe this has a number of advantages. First, it relates our results to a large body of earlier empirical work on trade flows. Second, by centering attention on bilateral trade rather than aggregate trade or the current account, our test procedure greatly widens the range of relevant observations available for testing. Third, by focusing on bilateral trade, the choice also enables us to treat the prices of imports relative to home goods as an exogenous variable. Evidently, the influence of a country's imports from any specific trade partner on its relative prices at home can be supposed small. Thus, single-equation estimation is reasonable.
However, because the gravity model focuses on bilateral trade, a difficult challenge arises in drawing implications about aggregate trade balances from the model. This is a challenge we try to meet by conditioning our estimates of the influence of relative prices on bilateral trade on countries' desired aggregate trade balances (which, in turn, depend on their desired intertemporal substitution). Crucially, we find that relative prices only emerge clearly as an influence in the econometric results once we constrain countries to have an intertemporal objective in the estimation period. Thus, not only are our macroeconomic concerns reflected in our methodology, but they play a vital role in our estimates. It is important to stress that the intertemporal objective in our work implies no notable departure from the usual static form of the gravity model. There is both a present and future, but we assume that the observed net trade balances are equal to the desired levels in our study period as a whole. In addition, no error-correction mechanism or other adaptation to deviations from desired outcomes works along the way. While desired intertemporal trade is essential, the intertemporal budget constraint has no separate role to play.
There is also the fundamental issue of the appropriate measure of relative prices to use in a gravity framework. What we need is some index of prices of imported goods relative to prices of domestically produced ones. To this end, we employ the ratio of CPI prices relative to GDP prices. Better alternatives may exist, some of which relate more closely to trade costs, but their use would gravely limit the number of observations in our study. This consideration led us to use the CPI/GDP measure in this exploration of the topic, which is our first. But we shall control for other factors besides trade costs that may affect the results. In particular, the foreign exchange rate will enter. OR ignore this factor in developing their general argument.
They do so for good reason, since even under a single world money, countries cannot import more and export less without an increase in their prices CIF relative to prices FOB. Trade costs inexorably come in even under a common currency. Notwithstanding this consideration, in the data itself the prices CPI relative to prices GDP could evidently reflect the influence of the nominal exchange rate to some extent, and if they did so, the required price adjustment in order to move the trade balance would partly reflect a nominal change. In this case, the price adjustment might be less socially costly. Furthermore, the coefficient of our relative price variable would then reflect something other than trade costs. However, when added as a con-ditioning variable (with appropriate weights), the nominal exchange rate does not alter the level or the significance of our estimate of the ratio of prices CPI relative to prices GDP. Consequently, we interpret the impact of this price ratio as truly independent of any nominal influence.
Theory and test specification a. Theory
We propose deviating from the simple form of the gravity model on a single point in order to apply this model to the impact of trade costs on trade balances: we shall assume that households in different countries differ in their tastes for intertemporal substitution. In all other respects, we shall follow the typical treatment where all preferences for goods in the world are identical, output is exogenous and exports are demand-determined. On these assumptions, there is generally no reason for systematic deviations from bilateral trade balance. 2 Accordingly, researchers who rely on these assumptions usually take the dependent variable as total bilateral trade, measured as the sum, or the average, of bilateral imports both ways. Subsequently, they ignore any influence of relative price, as they must, since the opposite influence of this variable on trade partners (in the case of an elasticity of substitution different from one) becomes impossible to study. However, once we allow for differences in intertemporal preferences, each country may aim for a different trade balance. Consequently, it makes sense to distinguish the desired imports of country A from country B and the desired imports of country B from country A. In this context, it is possible to study the influence of relative price on imports as distinct from exports in the framework of the simple gravity model. 3 Suppose then that households in each country decide on their aggregate current consumption by maximizing an intertemporal utility function, subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. A certain desired level of current spending follows in each country depending on 2 Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004) make the same point and then proceed to distinguish between bilateral imports and exports differently than we do: by allowing for heterogeneities between firms. But there is plainly no conceptual conflict between their manner of proceeding and ours. 3 See Helpman (1987) , McCallum (1995) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . For a notable example of a version of the gravity model distinguishing between import and export behavior from the start and where relative prices thus prominently enter, see Bergstrand (1985 Bergstrand ( , 1989 . exogenous endowments, production functions and (assuming small countries) exogenous prices. Let us label this desired current spending, or absorption, by a particular country, i, as 
where c ij is country i's consumption (in physical units) of the goods (varieties) produced by country j, β j is a distribution parameter, reflecting Y j /Y w , the output of country j relative to world output, and K is the number of countries in the world. Country i maximizes this function subject to the condition: ,
where p ij is the (common) price of goods (varieties) produced by country j and facing country i. The solution to the maximization problem yields:
where ( )
Imports of country i from country j, m ij , equal p ij c ij and therefore:
A similar relationship holds for bilateral imports of country j from i: where t ij reflects all border costs faced by country i in its trade with country j as a percentage of P j , both monetary and non-monetary. p ij will now differ considerably between countries even though p j is everywhere the same, and partly so for non-monetary reasons. In the light of the trade costs, equation (6) can be written as:
In this paper, we shall estimate a version of equation (8).
b. Test specification
In order to estimate equation (8), we need a measure of the term (1+t ij )p j /P i , which is often referred to as bilateral trade resistance relative to multilateral trade resistance, where the t ij term captures bilateral resistance and the P i one (itself a weighted-average) reflects multilateral resistance. As is common in the gravity approach, we treat bilateral trade resistance and multilateral trade resistance separately. In the case of bilateral trade resistance, we introduce the usual gravity variables concerning impediments or aids to bilateral trade, such as distance, language and political associations.
Multilateral trade resistance requires special discussion. Assume that the price of GDP, , is a reflection of p i GDP P i , the price of the home good(s). Suppose, in addition, that we can interpret the consumer price index, , as a weighted average of prices of home goods and import prices. If rises, there is then a rise in foreign relative to home prices and a negative price influence on country i's demand for foreign goods in general relative to home goods. This is clear in the case of final goods, to which we limit the theoretical discussion (like OR and most of the literature on the gravity model). Imports of intermediary goods may raise a complication, since they also affect . However, they influence as well. Thus, in their presence, if only the mix of final and intermediate goods in trade stays constant, a rise in imports will still increase relative to . Regardless, therefore, is a basic reflection of multilateral trade resistance.
In a multiple currency world, another such reflection will be a weighted average of the exchange rate of the currency of country i with the other world currencies. This next variable may be partly registered in but will not necessarily be fully so. Besides, as already indicated, it is important to separate the potential influence of the nominal exchange rate from the relative price term. Therefore, we will consider the weighted-average nominal exchange i GDP i CPI P / P rate of country i, E i , as a separate influence in the analysis. In addition, even upon a cursory examination of equation (4), we see that and E i GDP i CPI P / P i only cover two of many sources of multilateral trade resistance affecting trade between countries i and j (since all bilateral trade frictions connected to third countries enter into the expression). In order to reflect these other influences, country fixed effects for countries i and j may serve in the typical way. The dummy for country i will then reflect all the missing effects on country i's desired imports from everyone, while that for country j will reflect all the missing effects on its exports to everyone. Since both and E i GDP i CPI P / P i are country-specific variables, once the country dummies are added, the estimates of the influences of the two evidently will only relate to the time dimension or their movement over time.
In light of these considerations, we may write equation (8) in the following form:
where is a dummy for the importing country, is a dummy for the exporting country,
ij is a matrix of bilateral gravity variables pertaining to bilateral trade resistance (relating specifically to trade of country i with the particular partner j), and ε ij is a disturbance term with the usual properties. On the basis of equation (8), it follows that: a 1 = -lnY W and a 2 = 1.
A corresponding equation to (11) exists for the imports of country j from country i:
where and are, respectively, dummies for countries j and i as importer and exporter.
Consequently, a more general statement of the estimating equation is:
where we have also added a matrix of time dummies D t . There are effectively 2N different country dummies of the sort displayed in equation (11), two per country. In the case of any particular observation, m ij , all of these dummies are zero except two, and
Z . We thus propose estimating equation (8) in the form of equation (11).
However, equation (11) only reflects the intertemporal concern of countries in the derivation in a vague way. The most direct reflection of this concern is the substitution of domestic absorption for domestic income in the aggregate for current spending by the importer. The only other reflection is our distinction between bilateral imports and exports and our associated introduction of the price variables, ( ) and E i GDP i CPI P / P i . But these features do little to insure that the desired trade balance has a basic role in the estimates. In sum, equation (11) offers inadequate reflection of the emphasis on desired intertemporal substitution in the theoretical derivation. In order to sharpen the role of the intertemporal aspect, we propose estimating equation (11) under the theoretical constraint that each country satisfies its desired balance between imports and exports. We do so by imposing the equality of the estimated values of desired net import balances with the observed values over the study period as a whole.
Specifically, we proceed by introducing the following restriction on the coefficient of the fixed effect for the importing country, a 5 :
where is the number of in-sample observations of imports by country i, is the number 
and are the imports from country i by its K-1 trade partners,
The coefficient a 5 evidently applies in every period. 4 But we only assign any importance to it 4 A preferable form of the restriction might be for the observation period as a whole (T individual periods) or in the context of equation (12). 5 Basically, the equation gives teeth to the idea that countries pursue a trade balance objective. Note that imposing the constraint strictly on the fixed effects for the importing country is precisely correct since exports are demand-determined according to the model.
Ideally, the constraint should refer to the difference between the imports and the exports of countries, X i , rather than the difference between their imports and the imports of the rest from them . X ji M i is always lower than because of trade costs. Specifically,
ij t where τ ji is the money difference between the price to the importer and the price to the exporter as a percentage of the export price p i . τ ji must be less than t ji because, as mentioned earlier, at least on a cross-sectional basis, the demand for imports also depends on various nonmonetary trade costs (related to language, cultural affinities and political ties, etc.) which do not affect the difference between the value of shipments from i and foreign purchases from i.
But as we do not model the differences X i -M ji , or the K-1 monetary differences between prices FOB and prices CIF, τ ji p i , in equation (15) (11) is only 36%. Hence, the estimate of (11) reflects the trade balance behavior of the countries only in a vague way, as we suspected it would. However, once these restrictions are imposed, the correlation between (M i -M ji ) t and ( -) i M ji M t rises to over 80%. There is therefore little doubt that the restrictions serve their assigned role of reflecting the individual countries' aggregate net imports (which we identify with their desired net imports) over the observation
But this form is not feasible. 5 Equating the desired and actual trade balances every year along the way would require separate annual coefficients for .
M i N period. Moreover, it turns out that the impact of on trade only emerges significantly in our work following the introduction of these restrictions. This is very reassuring since, as we mentioned before, the role of in our specification rests essentially on desired intertemporal substitution. It is thus entirely consistent with our analysis that would emerge as significant when desired intertemporal substitution plays a major role in the estimate, but not otherwise.
The main focus of our empirical work will be on the coefficient of the relative price term, . This coefficient is our basis for inferring how large a movement in the price of imports relative to home goods a country must entertain if it wishes to change its trade balance. In other words, we base our conclusions entirely on the results following the restrictions in equation (12). 
Econometric Results

a. The time series behavior of trade balances and current accounts
If the time series behavior of the current account is driven by the time series properties of trade balances, then the two time series should have very similar properties. In this section we demonstrate, using variance ratio statistics, that for most countries in our sample this is indeed the case. This statistic (see Cochrane (1988) ) rests on the null hypothesis of a random walk against the alternative of mean-reversion. The statistic is:
where k denotes the lag length, and Var is the variance of the series q, i.e. the ratio of either the trade balance or the current account to output. Under the null of a random walk V k should equal unity, while if a series is stationary V k will be significantly less than unity. We implement this statistic using annual lags of up to 8 in a time series of 21 years (for most countries).
The most telling feature of the results is that a very similar pattern of persistence ap-pears for the current account and the trade balance. For the majority of countries, both series are stationary although quite persistent (i.e. they do not display rapid mean reversion).
Whenever this is so there is also little to distinguish between the time series behavior of the two series. Figure 1 displays the point for a sample of 16 countries, chosen to reveal the general picture. The sample consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, Thailand, US, and the United Kingdom. In 12 of the cases, both ratios to output are stationary (the ratio of net income on foreign assets to output is included in the figure as supplementary information).
For these cases, the persistence of the two series is much alike. In the other four cases, sometimes the current account is more non-stationary than the trade balance − Finland, Germany and the United Kingdom -and once it is the opposite -the US. But even then, as seen in the examples of Germany and the US, the two series may still behave very similarly.
As we argued in Section 2, any country wishing to alter its current account position must alter its trade balance and therefore must move some of its prices from FOB to CIF, or vice versa. The slow mean reversion, or sluggishness, of trade balances, illustrated here, could then easily underlie the slow mean reversion of current accounts. Quite specifically, if trade balances tend to be small and to stay small, current account balances will do so too.
b. The gravity model results
We turn next to the evidence regarding our basic equation (11). All of our tests are maximum likelihood. Table 1 presents the estimates of this equation in the absence of any constraints for the full sample period and for two sub-samples, 1980-1989 and 1990-2000 . In these estimates, therefore, differences in desired trade balances between countries play only a vague role, as explained previously. The nominal exchange rate is also not included in the equations reported in Table 1 . According to the full sample results, the coefficient on the relative price term P CPI /P GDP has the correct sign but is very small and indeed statistically indistinguishable from zero. In addition, all of the coefficients pertaining to distance and absorption, two essential gravity terms, bear the correct signs, are significant and have plausible coefficient values. The remaining gravity terms, except for the Common Country and Free Trade Area dummies, are also statistically significant and have plausible magnitudes under both the oil and non-oil scenarios. One interesting result is that the common language dummy has a larger impact on trade than the currency union dummy, which is similar in magnitude to the figure initially proposed by Rose (2000) in his provocative study. In general, the results for the two sub-samples resemble those for the full sample, though the coefficient on the relative price term is barely statistically significant at the 10% confidence level in the sub-sample of 1980 to 1989.
The previous results do not impose intertemporal preferences in equation (11) precisely. However, the set of results contained in Table 2 follow once such preferences have been imposed (we emphasize that this constraint simply forces the actual trade balance to equal the desired balance over the sample period as a whole; by assumption the constraint does not introduce any dynamics or the intertemporal budget constraint). Once again, we offer these results separately for the full sample period and for the two sub-samples of 1980-1989 and 1990-2000 . Crucially, the coefficient on the P CPI /P GDP term is now highly statistically significant in the entire period as well as in both sub-periods. In all three cases, it has a value of approximately 0.3. In addition, the sign, magnitude and significance of the usual gravity variables are broadly similar to those reported in Table 1 where the trade constraint was not imposed. Once again, the coefficients on the gravity terms are broadly similar across the two sub-samples (although, in this case, there are some differences). 8 We believe that these results strongly support the theory. In principle, the relative price term affects imports relative to exports rather than total trade in the model. Thus, it makes sense that its impact would only show up clearly once desired intertemporal trade came explicitly into play. On the other hand, the other influences (apart from the nominal exchange rate) affect total trade, rather than the trade balance. Therefore, they should all be essentially independent of intertemporal considerations and that is in fact exactly what we find.
Quite significantly too, these results incorporate the impact of all relative price movements at the world level. Such movements are perfectly correlated with the time dummies. Thus, the estimates allow for the three oil shocks (1974, Iranian revolution, Gulf War) as well as all other changes in relative prices during the period. This will be important below in our interpretation of the impact of P CPI /P GDP as relating to trade costs.
In Table 3 we present the regressions with the nominal exchange rate as a separate conditioning variable. As we noted earlier, this serves the essential role of clarifying whether the coefficient on our relative price term partly reflects the influence of the nominal exchange rate on trade as well as trade costs. In accordance with the theoretical analysis, the nominal exchange rate we use is the effective rate, constructed on the basis of the import trade weights. The results are interesting: the coefficient on the nominal exchange rate is statistically significant in the constrained regression at the 10 percent confidence level. But its magnitude is numerically very close to zero, and its presence does not affect the magnitude or the significance of the coefficient on the relative price term. 9 Of some interest too, the variable is completely insignificant in the unconstrained regression. This reinforces our view that the constraint is important in bringing to light the effects of price variables that influence the desired trade balance or imports relative to exports. This need not be surprising since our estimates pertain to long run adjustments in trade balances. Nominal exchange rate movements promote real exchange rate changes in the short run. But their contribution to long run movements in the real exchange rate is not nearly as plain.
Trade Costs and the Influence of Consumer Prices Relative to Producer Prices
The consumer price index is made up of prices of imports and home-produced goods.
Purely as an expository device, suppose we equate all producer prices and consumer prices on home-produced goods. This agrees with our theoretical discussion, where we suppose zero trade costs at home, although, as we shall see shortly, this assumption is inessential. Then if we let p i be the index of the production price of the home good, p j be the index of the production price of the good of country j and K be the number of countries, we may write (16), we may recall, is the fraction of t ij consisting exclusively of money trade costs or differences between prices CIF and FOB. are low (below one) in some countries relative to others, they must be high (above one) elsewhere, at least on average. Therefore, if we suppose symmetry of positive and negative effects, the costs and mark-ups have no significant impact on the coefficient of on the whole. In fact, this reasoning applies to domestic trade costs too, so that our earlier assumption of no domestic trade costs is unnecessary, as stated above (but it aids the exposition). On the other hand, foreign trade costs necessarily raise consumer prices relative to production prices everywhere. Indeed, we believe this factor to be implicit in OR's emphasis on trade costs as the key to the six major puzzles in international macroeconomics.
i CPI P / i GDP P However, we make allowance for some major deviations from this general reasoning in our empirical tests. Quite specifically, we admit asymmetric effects of changes in i j p / p on importing and exporting countries by controlling for the net impact of all movements in production costs, mark-ups and domestic trade costs (including taxes) at the world level on de-sired imports through the use of time dummies. Thus, as explained before, the net difference between the impact of the oil shocks on the demand for imports of oil importers and oil exporters enters fully in our results. In addition, we control for movements in the nominal effective exchange rate. By construction, this price must work in the same direction for all countries on the demand for imports (that is, in the case of pass-through). Given that we control for all changes at the world level over time and the nominal effective exchange rate, we conclude that the coefficient of in our work truly reflects the impact of 
Trade Costs and the Home Bias Puzzle
A higher coefficient of than .3 would have meant a lower required change in in order to obtain a one percent change in the trade balance. Evidently, therefore, our explanation of the FH puzzle depends on a low, yet significant, impact of trade costs on imports. On the contrary, OR require a large impact of trade costs on imports to explain the "home bias" puzzle in their way. There is therefore a basic tension between our proposed solution to the FH puzzle and OR's explanation of the "home bias" puzzle.
In dealing with this issue, we shall proceed in two steps. First, we will explain why our estimate for the impact of on the trade balance of 0.3 is really too low to explain the "home bias" puzzle based on trade costs alone, along the lines of OR. Second, we shall go on to suggest a solution and also try to justify it. As we shall see, our solution relies on a basic distinction between trade costs relating to the trade balance and trade costs which arise due to increasing levels of openness. The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle evidently relates to intertemporal substitution and therefore the trade balance, while the home bias puzzle relates to openness or the rai CPI P / i GDP P 10 In the case of the price of oil, we experimented with the separate effects on demand for imports of oil importers and exporters. The results confirm the usual impression that the adverse impact of the oil shocks on the imports of the oil-importing nations exceeded the impact on the oil-exporting ones. Since some collinearity arises between the relative oil price for importers and / , and since we wish to isolate the impact of / , it seems right to focus on the results in the absence of any disaggregation of the price of oil. OR effectively sidestep this difficulty by switching to an analysis of the impact of the real interest rate on the current account when they turn from the "home bias" to the FH puzzle. Even a moderate percentage change in relative prices may imply a large percentage movement in present relative to future real interest rates. Therefore, should the change in relative prices be moderate, as OR argue, it would still contribute heavily, in their reasoning, to the FH puzzle as well.
tio of total trade to output.
OR's results can be shown to follow exactly in our set up, given their assumptions. Consider two nations of equal size, and therefore Y i = Y j , and assume balanced trade, or Y i = A i .
Additionally, assume endowment economies with all relative prices the same and equal to one. Under these assumptions, (since t ii = 0) our equation (8) However, the value of t ij that we recover from our regressions using OR's assumptions is considerably below the one they suggest. To see this, note to begin with that in our work does not correspond exactly to the import price relative to the export price in OR's example. Instead, it refers to α i CPI P / i GDP P i + (1-α i )(1 + t ij ), as seen from equation (19) (after equating τ ij and t ij and setting j p and p i equal to one). Thus, in terms of OR's schematic example, our estimate relates to the value of (1-α i In fact, the problem is more complicated for two reasons. OR's ratio of 4.2 for m ii /m ij only looks reasonable because of their two-country example. In a multi-country framework this ratio would change dramatically. For example, assume the same parameter values as theirs but 100 identical countries so that country i imports from 99 others. In that case, the baseline situation without trade costs is one of .99 openness. Trade costs raising the ratio m ii /m ij by a factor of 4.2 in relation to each of the 99 foreign countries would then yield a rise in the percentage of home consumption from .01 to approximately .041. 13 In order to reduce the value of openness to a level as low as . The second problem relates to the identification of t ij and τ ij . So far as t ij exceeds τ ij , our implicit figure for money trade costs will be even lower than .1. But we regard this next problem as minor relative to the distortion introduced by limiting the analysis to a twocountry framework. As indicated before, non-money trade costs matter mostly on a crosssectional basis, or in choosing to trade between alternative foreign partners. In the strict temporal dimension, money costs probably dominate trade costs. Our estimate of the impact of relates strictly to the temporal dimension. Thus, we do not believe that equating t to .26 (x ≅ 1.26 for x 5 = .6 ÷ .19), which is clearly much closer to OR's ballpark figure of 13 The ratio of home consumption will be 4.2X where 99X + 4.2X = 1. 14 Let spending on the 99 foreign goods make up altogether .19 of the total consumer basket. Then the spending on the home good in relation to the individual foreign one is .81 divided by .19/99. 15 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) recently estimate t ij as 170%. This might suggest that 235% is not as outlandish as it may seem at first blush. But their figure includes the tax equivalent of all non-money impediments to trade that enter in the cross-sectional dimension in our estimates as well as the domestic impediments to trade. In answer, the assumption of flat values of τ ij is dubious, as OR recognize themselves.
As ratios of trade to output rise, trade in highly heterogeneous goods and in heavy, difficultto-transport goods, must increase. Consequently, even if values of τ ij of around .33 exist in trade, the values of τ ij relating to many goods that are not traded may well be over 100 percent. 16 (Betts and Kehoe (2001) and Bergen and Glick (2004) recently reason on this basis.)
As a result, there are really two separate values of trade costs that enter in case of movements of bilateral trade. One of them is relevant when the movements concern mere redistributions of output between existing firms or the churning of firms and varieties without any change in aggregate trade at a given level of output. The other is relevant when the ratio of trade to output changes. The first level, occurring when the trade ratio or degree of openness stays the same, is lower than the second, occurring when the trade ratio moves. The first one is also the relevant one in the case of the FH puzzle, while the second is the relevant one in the case of the "home bias" puzzle. Our estimates relate to the first. OR clearly have in mind the second.
There are several reasons why the two values of trade costs may be expected to differ even at the margin. If additional trade means that new goods (not simply new varieties) enter into foreign trade, the rise in trade costs at the margin may jump up rather than go up continuously. In addition, the trade costs may be higher at first than they will become later, after the initial information and distribution problems of launching the new products abroad settle down. In this connection, a lot of recent empirical work notably shows that entry of individual firms into export activity always entails major once-and-for-all costs of production and distribution. (See Roberts and Tybout (1997) , Bernard and Jensen (2001) and Bernard and Wagner (2001) .) Those fixed costs may well be more severe if entry means introducing new products abroad (rather than previously exported ones or newly exported ones that are merely differentiated, as is more likely to happen when the adjustments concern the trade balance at a set level of total national trade).
In sum, since our analysis focuses on the trade balance, our estimate of trade costs relates to the lower margin. The higher margin relates to openness and therefore to the ratio of total trade to output, which we do not analyze. If our interpretation is correct, movements in the ratios of trade balances to output for our sample period should be largely independent of movements in the ratios of trade to output. We therefore investigated the correlation between the two ratios in our panel. The exact calculation and the result are as follows:
(where the number in parentheses is the p value). The correlation is negligible, negative and statistically insignificant. We conclude that our estimate relates to the lower margin for trade costs.
Ruhl (2003) makes a similar point in a closely related context. He seeks to reconcile the low estimates of the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods in the business cycle literature with the much higher estimates of this same elasticity in the literature on the growth of trade, where the concern is with the impact of trade liberalization, free trade agreements and the like. In the former literature, the elasticities regard responses to transitory shocks whereas in the latter, they relate to responses to permanent shocks. He considers the former adjustments as ones on the "intensive margin" and the latter as ones on the "extensive margin". Our context differs because the adjustments in trade balance that we are interested in may well be persistent. However, the similarity remains so far as those adjustments do not necessarily require any change in the size of the traded goods sector relative to the economy as a whole, and therefore in the total range of goods entering into trade (ordered by trade costs). Thus, his distinction between adjustments at the intensive margin (same range of goods) and the extensive margin (wider range of goods) is apt.
Concluding discussion
In this paper, we have provided empirical support for OR's hypothesis that trade costs contribute to resolving the FH puzzle. According to our estimates, countries require a 1.67 percent adjustment in the price of the goods they consume relative to the price of the goods they produce for every percentage movement in their trade balance. Based on our interpretation of the relative price term, trade costs are the essential factor in the explanation. In support of this view, we have admitted time fixed effects and the nominal effective exchange rate as separate conditioning variables. Therefore, we can exclude relative price movements at the world level and the effective exchange rate as influences in our estimates.
In closing, two further points deserve emphasis. Our effort to resolve the FH puzzle in terms of trade costs deviates from OR in one crucial respect: we do not rely on expected future reversals in trade balance positions for our solution. Rather, in our view, the argument for their position can be made without going beyond the implications of their stand relating to trade balances. The reason for this deviation from them seems to us strong: countries with trade balance deficits tend to be net creditors, while those with trade surpluses tend to be net debtors. Studies of the FH puzzle cover wide samples of countries. Therefore, in dealing with the puzzle, it seems precarious to us to treat trade imbalances as unsustainable. There is little reason for markets systematically to expect trade balances to reverse and to embed such reversals in their real interest rate expectations (all the less so since the countries with trade deficits may have adequate future income prospects). This deviation from OR brings us close to Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2002a) and their emphasis on the stability of trade balance positions. The same time series evidence, though, is consistent with our view that both the small size and the sluggishness of trade balances are the key to the small size and the sluggishness of current accounts.
In conclusion, certain econometric features of our work deserve emphasis. We have used a gravity framework and data on bilateral trade to draw out implications about the impact of relative prices on national trade balances. Previous researchers have also introduced relative prices into the gravity framework, but their emphasis was on separate import and export responses to such prices (see, for example, Bergstrand (1989) and Bayoumi (1989) ). As far as we are aware, ours is the first attempt to use the gravity model to address the relationship between relative prices and national trade balances. In order to do so, despite the essential bilateral trade orientation of the model, we adopted a simple yet popular version of the gravity approach with passive export behavior, in which we incorporated desired intertemporal substitution at the national level. The relevant macroeconomic concern with the future has a profound role on our estimates. When we do not incorporate this effect, the relative price variable has no influence on bilateral trade, but when we do incorporate it the influence of this variable emerges clearly.
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Taylor, Alan (2002 (11) in the text). The coefficients of these dummies are not reported; robust standard errors in parentheses; correction for clustering of country pairs; characters in bold indicate coefficients significant at the 1% level; ** and * denote significance at the 5% and at the 10% level, respectively. Rho denotes the correlation between observed net imports and predicted net (11) in the text). The coefficients of these dummies are not reported; robust standard errors in parentheses; correction for clustering of country pairs; characters in bold indicate coefficients significant at the 1% level; ** and * denote significance at the 5% and at the 10% level, respectively. Rho denotes the correlation between observed net imports and predicted net NOTES: Regressions include time fixed effects and separate countries fixed effects for countries as importers and as exporters (see equation (11) in the text). The coefficients of these dummies are not reported; robust standard errors in parentheses; correction for clustering of country pairs; characters in bold indicate coefficients significant at the 1% level; ** and * denote significance at the 5% and at the 10% level, respectively. 
